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During the presidential campaign of 2002, (then) candidate Luis Inacio “Lula” da Silva made an unprecedented trip to Beijing, the first ever by a presidential can-didate. That trip signaled Lula’s ambition 
of creating a strategic relation with a group of emerging 
economies known as BRICS, Brazil, Russia, India, China 
and South Africa. Lula’s vision was pragmatic, non-ideo-
logical and sought to position Brazil among the leading 
countries of the world. He shared similar world affair 
views as President Hu Jintao and was convinced that co-
operation would create prosperity for both nations. One 
reason is that resource endowment factors make the two 
economies highly complementary. China is demanding 
large quantities of Brazilian commodity-based products 
that suffer market access barriers in advanced countries. 
Brazil offers a growing market for Chinese products and 
business opportunity for direct investment in infrastruc-
ture, energy and natural resources. The growing trade and 
economic links between the two countries in the last four 
years seems to vindicate President Lula’s strategic vision on 
this promising relation.1 
Despite President Lula´s administration strategic bet 
on China, there are doubts among intellectual and busi-
ness circles on whether Brazil is ready to face Chinese in-
dustrial competition. Mexico, at this point, is being close-
ly scrutinized because it has taken the brunt of Chinese 
competition. Mexican companies are losing market share 
in the United States, that absorbs ninety percent of their 
exports, and finding it increasingly hard to compete with 
Chinese products in their own market.2 Current thinking 
about China´ s presence in the world economy goes like 
this: Export what China is demanding i.e., commodities 
and you surely win. Try to compete with Chinese manu-
factured goods and you certainly lose. Economic data shed 
some light on the impact of world competition, including 
China, in Latin America’s manufacturing industry.3
a. Latin America’s manufacturing value-added (MVA) 
declined from $316.6 billion dollars in 2000 to $285.7 
billion in 2004, with the contribution to GDP also 
contracting from 17.2% to 16.6%.
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There are doubts among intellectual and business 
circles on whether Brazil is ready to face Chinese 
industrial competition.
b. Latin America’s manufactured exports in the same 
period grew by only 5.1% per annum, well below the 
world average of 8.8%. As a result, its regional share 
of world manufacturing trade plunged from 4.0% in 
2000 to 3.5% in 2004.
c. In medium- and high-technology exports, the fastest 
growing and highest value-added end of trade, Latin 
America’s world market share dropped from 3.8% in 
2000 to 3.2% in 2004.
d. The regional share of manufactured exports as a per-
centage of total exports has declined from 49.2% to 
48.2%, which shows an increasing trend towards low 
value-added commodity trade.
Taking notice of Mexico’s travail, President Lula’s admi-
nistration is under political pressure to come up with so-
lutions to deal with Chinese competition. Critics point out 
that if history serves as a guide, the outlook is not particu-
larly promising for Brazil and Latin America. The question 
then is whether the bilateral relation will flourish or turn 
into rivalry-commercial conflict. This paper explores those 
points in three parts. The first one reviews recent resear-
ch done by the Inter American Dialogue (IAD) and the 
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) on China-Latin 
America’s relation. The second part evaluates socioecono-
mic weaknesses and strengths of MERCOSUR and Mexico. 
The third part depicts different assumptions- scenarios to 
evaluate China-Latin America´ s medium term trade rela-
tions, followed by a summary and final comments. 
Part I. Literature Review 
The impact of China in Latin America and the Caribbean 
has sparked a large number of academic papers, books and 
newspaper articles in the last five years. Recent research 
done by the Inter-American Development Bank and the 
Inter-American Dialogue are prominent by their depth, 
analysis and bibliography. Let’s start with IAD, a research 
organization, specialized in Latin America-Caribbean 
countries and located in Washington DC. The IAD study 
takes the interesting approach of looking into Sino-Latin 
American motivations-incentives for closer economic, 
commercial, political and military cooperation.4 The un-
derlying hypothesis is whether China’s growing presence 
in Latin America should be considered a challenge to the 
United States. 
The 2006 Inter-American Dialogue Report
The study starts by pointing out that Latin America’s in-
ternational relations, in the beginning of the XXI Century, 
faced two exogenous shocks. First, a growing distance be-
tween the region’s governments and the administration of 
George W. Bush over many political e economic issues. 
Second, the dramatic entrance of China as a significant 
economic and, in some instances, political partner of Latin 
America [p.46]. Regarding distance from Washington, 
frustration in Latin America was caused mainly by poor 
results of the economic reforms of the 1990’s, known as 
the Washington Consensus. Also, the United States one-
dimensional, simplistic approach to free trade agreements 
as a solution to solve deep-seated social and economic 
problems in the region did not help to improve relations 
either. 
Chinese long term strategic thinking is revealed in how 
Beijing is engaging the Latin American countries since the 
1970’s. One important aspect of this strategy was to send 
young diplomats to study Spanish and learn about Latin 
American culture in ‘El Colegio de Mexico´[p.21]. From 
my own experience, Chinese diplomats posted in Latin 
America are second to none to any western country. They 
are well trained, tackle problems with determination, listen 
with care and incorporate local concerns in their decision 
making process. Increasingly, knowledge of Latin America’s 
culture and politics allows Chinese diplomats to avoid past 
mistakes made by western developed countries. Chinese 
top leadership avoids empty promises and Presidential di-
plomacy is only used when concrete commercial and eco-
nomic deals are on the table for discussion. 
The report states that Brazil-China relations are truly 
strategic in nature because they encompass growth of tra-
de, cross country investment and technology cooperation. 
Also, both countries seek a stronger and more influential 
place in international affairs and welcome a more res-
trained role by the United States [p.27]. A section on the 
China-Venezuelan relation concludes 
that President Hugo Chavez’s efforts to 
get closer political and economic rela-
tions with Beijing, as a counter force to 
the United States, has few chances to 
succeed. The reason being that Beijing 
needs a benign relation with Washington far more than a 
strategic partnership with Venezuela [pp 42-44]. 
Critics may take stock with the conclusion above, ar-
guing that it may hold true only in the short term. However, 
if President Chavez continues to win elections and holds to 
power, in a way similar to Fidel Castro in Cuba, the re-
lation might become strategic. Historical evidence shows 
that long-term economic links between countries lead, 
inevitably, to deeper cooperation in cultural, political and 
military affairs. 
In summary, the IAD report laid down a comprehensi-
ve overview of geo-political, security-defense and econo-
mic issues of current Sino-Latin American relations. As in 
any complex and new phenomenon involving geo-politics, 
economics and security-defense matters, there are no defi-
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Mexican companies are losing market share in the 
United States, that absorbs 90% of their exports, and 
are finding it increasingly hard to compete against 
Chinese products in their own market.
nitive answers on how the situation will evolve in the near 
future. For the reader, everything comes down to what one 
believes based on ideology, knowledge and economic in-
terest. Take, as an example, the intellectual framework in 
which the Chinese presence in Latin America is being de-
bated by think tanks located in Washington DC.
Current thinking is divided into two groups. The first 
one, with a radical view, thinks that China represents the 
most serious challenge to Washington since the end of the 
Cold War, pointing out Beijing’s presence in the Panama 
Canal, political support of Fidel Castro and growing inte-
rest in Venezuela’s abundant oil and gas reserves. Venezuela 
is a special source of concern for three reasons. First, it is 
a major oil supplier of the United States, representing 15% 
of its total imports. Second, the current President, Hugo 
Chavez, is an outspoken critic and political adversary of 
Washington. Third, President Chavez’s approach of ta-
ckling the country’s massive level of poverty – via an au-
thoritarian style of government – may spread and create a 
“pink tide” anti-American coalition in the region. 
The second group, with a slightly moderate view, ar-
gues that growing economic and commercial ties between 
China and Latin America can play a positive role in hel-
ping international insertion and development of the latter. 
As one expert of this group recently quipped: Perhaps the 
Chinese have better ideas on how to solve Latin American 
problems after one hundred years of attempts by the United 
States. At this point, views expressed by radicals and mod-
erates are debated only in academic and diplomatic circles 
and do not influence policymaking. The reasons are the 
US administration total focus on the Iraq war and, both 
groups could not articulate a set of workable policies to 
support their respective positions. 
The 2006 Inter-American Development Bank Report
The IDB was the first multilateral financial institution 
to undertake major research to assess the strategic impli-
cations of China’s economic performance on growth and 
development in Latin America.5 Despite a variety of top-
ics being touched, the main focus is centered on trade and 
investment. The book is divided into five chapters, includ-
ing a vast and rich bibliography review, background papers 
and references. 
The main conclusions of this research can be summa-
rized as follows. Historically, China’s emergence as an eco-
nomic powerhouse is not entirely new. Reemergence is a 
more appropriate description, since China had the world’s 
largest economy for most the past thousand years. Until 
the 15th century China was not only the world’s richest 
country but also a technological leader. Current high rates 
of growth will be accompanied by radical changes in the 
makeup of Chinese export competitiveness and import de-
mand. Countries enjoying a boom in commodity demand 
from China, or facing stiff competition in basic textiles and 
apparel, may find a different playing field ten years hence. 
China will be buying ‘lighter’ imports and selling much 
more specialized and sophisticated textiles and apparel. 
Anticipating China’s position in the international value 
chain is as important strategically as ma-
naging the benefits and competitive chal-
lenges of today.
For Latin America, China’s emergence 
as a major player in the world markets in-
volves at least three important dimensions: 
1. A potential market of 1.3 billion consu-
mers but also a low-cost producer of goods and services; 
2. China’s becoming an important economic-commercial 
partner; 3. China turning into a strong competitor for 
Latin America’s manufactured goods. The main challenge 
for policy makers is how to reconcile findings from these 
separate three dimensions and forge an effective response 
to the Chinese phenomenon [pp. 195-198]
The Bank’s research is the best analytical reference on 
the challenges and opportunities presented by China’s 
emergence. In this respect, it touches the crux of the mat-
ter i.e., whether Latin America is prepared, or not, to cope 
with Chinese competition. The rapporteur takes a rather 
optimistic view on the so-called competitive (positive) as-
sets of Latin America to face global-Chinese competition. 
They are resource endowment-geography, democracy, vi-
brant private sector and economic integration. Conversely, 
inequality, poor educational system, highly skewed income 
distribution and weak public institutions are mentioned as 
negative assets [pp.209-226]. 
The bank´ s report can be enhanced further if additio-
nal research is done on the (difficult) task of weighting and 
judging Latin America’s positive and negative assets. For 
instance, do positive assets offset the negative ones or vice-
versa? Is there a set of effective socioeconomic policies to 
enhance the positive assets and offset the negative ones? 
Policy makers require this type of analysis in order to pre-
pare a coherent strategy to deal with the questions at hand. 
For many, a merging of MERCOSUR-NAFTA is probably 
the only chance to create a level playing field to face global 
competition, particularly from China and India. 
A background paper prepared for the main IDB report 
takes a less optimistic view on whether Latin America can 
compete with Chinese manufactured goods.6 According to 
Mesquita, even without the presence of China, the future 
of manufacturing in Latin America is usually seen with 
pessimism on the grounds of geography and endowments. 
The sector’s tribulations of the last two decades seem to 
corroborate this point of view. Yet, geography and endow-
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ments do not tell the whole story. The 
import substitution legacy, macroeco-
nomic volatility and the overreaction 
to the excesses of government inter-
vention also played a major role in the 
sector’s misfortunes [p.27]. To deal with 
the shortcomings, a set of policy rec-
ommendations are made: a. strengthen 
macroeconomic fundamentals; b. less-
en credit-constraints of domestic pro-
ducers, competing with highly lever-
aged Chinese firms; c. boost domestic 
technological capabilities i.e., human 
capital, science and technological in-
frastructure [pp.27-28]. 
Mesquita’s excellent analytical work 
can be enhanced further with resear-
ch on whether macro and micro-eco-
nomic policies in Latin America are 
correctly in place and are sustainable 
in order to support policy recommen-
dations. In the case of Brazil, as discus-
sed next, macroeconomic policy is not 
compatible with and, far from being an 
ideal one to promote industrial deve-
lopment and increase productivity in 
manufacturing production. 
Part II. MERCOSUR and Mexico7 
At the end of 1980’s, after the suc-
cessive energy crises of 1974-1982, it 
became clear that the industrial im-
port-substitution strategy to overcome 
underdevelopment had failed in Latin 
America and the Caribbean. Mexico, 
Brazil and Argentina, the most ad-
vanced industrial economies in the 
region, took different integration paths 
as a way to correct the failures of the 
past. In the case of Brazil, Argentina, 
Paraguay and Uruguay the decision 
was to form a custom union, mirrored 
in the European model, which culmi-
nated in the creation of the Southern 
Common Market under the Asuncion 
Treaty of 1991. Chile, Bolivia and Peru 
became associated members i.e., linked to the bloc via a 
trade agreement. Venezuela became the fifth full member 
of the custom union on 4th July 2006.8 Its definitive ac-
ceptance, however, depends on approval by the respective 
Congresses. 
Mexico’s leadership decided to deep the country’s his-
torical economic ties with the United States via the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), signed in 
December of 1994. The novelty of this agreement was that, 
Table 1











Canada 16 8.4 9
México 58 3.5 15
United Status 6 7.6 2
EUROPE
Austria 17 8.7 22
Belgium 20 7.4 10
Denmark 4 9.5 32
Finland 2 9.6 35
France 18 7.5 5
Germany 8 8.2 1
Greece 47 4.3 n/a
Iceland 14 9.7 n/a
Ireland 21 7.4 26
Italy 42 5.0 8
Netherlands 9 8.6 6
Norway 12 8.9 28
Portugal 34 6.5 47
Spain 28 7.0 17
Sweden 3 9.2 21
Switzerland 1 9.1 20
United Kingdom 10 8.6 7
Notes
Global Competitiveness Index: from World Economic Forum (2006), Global Competitiveness 
Report 2006-2007.
Corruption Perceptions Index: relates to perceptions of the degree of corruption as seen 
by business people and country analyst and ranges between 10 (highly clean) and 0 
(highly corrupt). Source: Transparency International (2005).
Exports Ranking: 50 Leading exporters and importers in world merchandise trade, 2005. 
Source: WTO (2006).
for the first time ever, a developing country accepted in-
tegration with a highly advanced economy without any 
financial support except for managed trade and promises 
of direct investment. Before NAFTA, the idea of integra-
tion was the European Union model. Criticism of NAFTA 
should be tempered by reality and realpolitik. It would be 
politically impossible for business corporations and the US 
Executive branch to sell the European integration model to 
Congress. It requires macroeconomic coordination, joint 
trade negotiations and financial support to other member 
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countries. More importantly, labor mobility is a key factor 
at the advanced stage of a common market, something un-
thinkable in the US political system. 
Competitiveness: How Latin America is positioned in 
the global economy?
The main objective of economic integration in Latin 
America and the Caribbean is to be competitive in the 
global economy. According to Professor Michael E. Porter 
of Harvard Business School: “The world economy is not 
a zero-sum game. Many nations can improve their pros-
perity if they can improve productivity. The central chal-
lenge in economic development, 
then, is how to create the conditions 
for rapid and sustained productiv-
ity growth.”9 Since independence from 
Portugal and Spain in the XIX century, 
there were several attempts at politi-
cal and economic integration in Latin 
America and the Caribbean. After 15 
years of the existence of MERCOSUR 
and 12 years of Mexico’s integration 
in the North America Free Trade Area 
(NAFTA), how are the main econo-
mies of Mexico, Brazil and Argentina 
globally positioned? 
In order to answer the question 
above, three sets of indicators, 2006 
Global Competitiveness Index (GCI), 
the Corruption Perception Index 
(CPI) 2005 and WTO exporting rank-
ing 2006 are used in Table I. Countries 
are grouped according to geograph-
ic location and/or trading-integra-
tion blocs, i.e., NAFTA, EU, Asia and 
MERCOSUR. The global competitive-
ness index (GCI) provides qualitative 
data on how countries are positioned 
in the global economy as far as attract-
ing investments, doing business and 
overall quality of life for their citizens. 
The corruption perception index works 
as a proxy to evaluate economic per-
formance.10 Essential public work such 
as roads, bridges, schools, hospitals 
(despite cost overruns) is always fin-
ished in advanced countries. Corrupt 
officials and politicians are punished, 
most of the time. Public work in a de-
veloping country is kept unfinished 
and, when finished, presents cost over-
runs that sometimes bankrupt public 
finances. Corrupt public officials and 
politicians are seldom found guilty and/
or punished. 
The use of export ranking index 
deals with the question of trade-wealth creation and in-
come distribution. The set of indicators would be com-
plete if education had been included. Knowledge is a key 
proxy to measure economic competitiveness and quality 
of life. Latin America is consistently below world stan-
dards in primary, secondary and university education lev-
els. The ranking of university quality teaching illustrates 
this point. Among the top two hundred best universities 
in the world, there are only two located in the region i.e., 
Universidad Autónoma de Mexico (UNAM), ranking 193 
and Universidade de Sao Paulo (USP), ranking 195.11 
Table 1











Australia 19 8.8 27
China 54 3.2 3
Hong Kong 11 8.3 11
India 43 2.9 29
Japan 7 7.3 4
South Korea 24 5.0 12
Malaysia 26 5.1 19
New Zealand 23 9.6  
Singapore 5 9.4 14
Taiwan 13 5.9  
Thailand 35 3.8 25
MERCOSUR
Argentina 69 2.8 46
Bolívia 92 2.5 n/a
Brazil 66 3.7 23
Chile 27 7.3 45
Paraguay 106 2.1 n/a
Uruguay 73 5.9 n/a
Venezuela 88 2.3 38
Notes
Global Competitiveness Index: from World Economic Forum (2006), Global Competitiveness 
Report 2006-2007.
Corruption Perceptions Index: relates to perceptions of the degree of corruption as seen by 
business people and country analyst and ranges between 10 (highly clean) and 0 (highly 
corrupt). Source: Transparency International (2005).
Exports Ranking: 50 Leading exporters and importers in world merchandise trade, 2005. 
Source: WTO (2006).
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What does Table I tell us? Mexico is well ranked in 
trade due to strong links with the United States but com-
petitiveness is low and perception of corruption is high. 
Income generated by exports of goods and services worth 
$215 billion in 2005, including 1.8 million of barrels of 
oil a day [Banco de Mexico’s statistics] is highly concen-
trated in the hands of a few. Since NAFTA came into ef-
fect in December 1994, the number of Mexicans seeking 
to enter the United States illegally increased substantial-
ly. Nearly half of the country’s 106 million people live in 
poverty. However, it has more billionaires [10 as of 2005] 
than Switzerland according to Forbes magazine’s list of the 
world richest people. A recent in-depth World Bank report 
concludes that concentration of wealth is the main con-
straint for economic growth.12 The state of Nuevo Leon, 
capital Monterrey and Chiapas, capital Tuxtla Gutierrez 
illustrates the relation between wealth, trade creation, re-
gional inequality and concentration of income. 
Monterrey, along the US border, has the highest per 
capita income in the country and a sophisticated manu-
facture industry highly integrated to North America’s pro-
duction chain. The state enjoys a high rate of literacy and 
its political-business elites are comfortable with US cultu-
re. Tuxtla Gutierrez, bordering Guatemala, has the lowest 
per capita income in the country and a subsistence-type 
of agriculture as the main activity. It holds a very large 
illiterate population and the highest poverty level in the 
country. Domestic political dynamics explains such regio-
nal contrast. As elsewhere in Latin America, the political 
system creates regional inequality and a highly skewed in-
come distribution, enhanced further by trade creation we-
alth generated in the last decade. Brazil’s socio-economic 
picture is a mirror image of those of Mexico. The states 
of Sao Paulo, capital Sao Paulo and Maranhão, capital Sao 
Luis are the counterparts of Nuevo Leon and Chiapas.
Chile holds the best competitiveness ranking for a 
Latin American economy with a good export performan-
ce and low perception of corruption. Chile’s success story 
is due to economic reforms undertaken in the 1970’s and 
1980’s. These reforms included reduction of import tari-
ffs, attraction of foreign direct investment, prudent fiscal 
and monetary policies to control inflation while maintai-
ning a favorable exchange rate to promote exports. The 
country’s economic reforms were only possible after lea-
ving the “Comunidad Andina de Naciones” in 1976, a cus-
tom union type of integration incompatible with Chile´ s 
decision of unilateral import tariff reduction. 
Despite Chile’s success in promoting natural resour-
ces based exports, it is still unable to develop an effective 
strategy to create knowledge-based products. Switzerland’s 
ranking (1) in competitiveness illustrates this point. This 
European country success is due to good institutions and 
competent macroeconomic management, areas in which 
Chile stands in the same league as Switzerland. Also, Swiss 
world-class educational system has focused on technology 
and innovation that leads to a successful strategy for boos-
ting competitiveness. In this requisite, Chile has a long way 
to go in relation to advanced countries.
MERCOSUR as a platform to compete in the dyna-
mic sectors of world economy has failed so far. Brazil and 
Argentina have very low marks on com-
petitiveness, perception of corruption is 
high and trade position is mediocre for 
countries with great export potential. 
Brazil’s ranking as the 11th economy in 
terms of size is irrelevant given its (low) 
ranking in competitiveness and high perception of corrup-
tion. China and India present levels of competitiveness not 
much better than Brazil. However, if Brazil, Argentina and 
Mexico are having problems competing with Chinese and 
Indian manufactured goods today, what will happen in a 
few years when both Asian economies will certainly be 
better positioned? 
Latin America’s main lesson is that trade-based inte-
gration of an emerging economy with an advanced one is 
not a short cut and/or a solution for underdevelopment. 
Trade wealth creation, not accompanied by compensatory 
public policies, exacerbate an income gap between regions 
and social groups. This situation leads, inevitably, to poli-
tical turmoil and social unrest. Democracy, as practiced in 
Latin America and the Caribbean, has failed to provide an 
effective solution for income distribution. From a histori-
cal perspective, it has created few winners and millions of 
losers. 
Finally, there is a connection between competitiveness, 
corruption, trade and security-defense. Countries highly 
competitive, with strong trade position and low levels of 
corruption have modern public defense forces, extremely 
costly nowadays. Also they provide better internal security 
for their citizens against violence and crime. Conversely, 
countries with poor levels of competitiveness, weak trade 
position and high levels of corruption have outdated de-
fense forces and cannot provide adequate domestic pro-
tection for their citizens against violence and crime. This 
is true for MERCOSUR and Mexico, except for Chile that 
provides adequate internal security and is rapidly moder-
nizing its armed forces. 
MERCOSUR: Strengths and Vulnerabilities
The strengths and weaknesses can be grouped into 
three areas: Institutional framework, perception of the eli-
te and strategy of insertion into (dynamic) areas of glo-
bal trade. There is a divorce between the theoretical pro-
ject of constructing a custom union, aimed at becoming a 
Increasingly, knowledge of Latin America’s culture and 
politics allows Chinese diplomats to avoid past mistakes 
made by Western developed countries.
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Latin America’s main lesson is that trade-based 
integration of an emerging economy with an 
advanced one is not a shortcut or a solution for 
underdevelopment.
common market, and the day-by-day reality. A free trade 
area, requisite for a full custom union, has not been esta-
blished yet. The integration bloc lacks rigor and discipline 
to apply norms and regulations agreed upon. Three four-
ths of approved community norms and regulations were 
never adopted by each country, since there is no penalty 
and/or incentive to do so. Despite the existence of a con-
flict resolution mechanism [Protocolo de Olivos] to settle 
commercial disputes, another instrument [Mecanismo de 
Ajuste Competitivo-MAC] was signed between Brazil and 
Argentina in 2006. This mechanism resembles a safeguard 
type of instrument, prohibited in a custom union.
Important segments of the political, business, academic 
and diplomatic corps lack strong belief in the integration 
process. They argue that economic integration among 
poor countries is bound to fail since there is not a single 
example of a success story until now. Another weakness is 
lack of competitiveness of Brazilian and Argentinean ma-
nufactured goods in the global markets. This leads to bila-
teral conflicts of difficult resolution. As manufacture goods 
lose competitiveness in extra-regional markets, exporters 
start to compete for a (relatively) small market offered by 
the integration bloc. The conflicts between Argentina and 
Brazil mirror those of the European Union in agriculture 
products, revealing in both cases low levels of competiti-
veness. 
Brazil – the largest economy of MERCOSUR – illustra-
tes the (unsolved) problem of how to implement a com-
prehensive strategy to increase competitiveness of manu-
factured goods. For more than a decade, the country has 
been experiencing low rates of growth, that can be descri-
bed in macroeconomic terms as follows: High public debt 
[60%/GDP] combined with high real interest rates + over-
valued currency + heavy taxation [39%/GDP] = Average 
GDP growth of 2.5% year. Besides a mediocre growth rate, 
the unfavorable macroeconomic framework induces a 
high marginal propensity to import and a low propensi-
ty to export products with high value added. In turn, this 
increases the share of low value added commodities in the 
balance of payments. In addition, a tight public budget po-
sition, caused by payment of public debt, prevents allot-
ting much-needed funds to upgrade the decaying and an-
tiquated infrastructure. Therefore, macroeconomic policy 
can and must be changed in Lula´s second term in office. 
The question is how long it will take to turn the economy 
around.
The shortcomings of the macroeconomic policies cited 
above, combined with an antiquated and decaying infras-
tructure, are causing trouble to producers and exporters to 
compete domestically and internationally. The country is 
rapidly losing market share in products such as shoes, tex-
tiles, clothing, transport vehicles, machine tools, chemi-
cal products and steel that were highly competitive in the 
past. The problem is compounded by low literacy rates and 
poor training of the working force that prevent develop-
ment of knowledge-based industry. Consequently, levera-
ged companies are starting to move production outside the 
country, in a rapid process of internationalization. Steel, 
mining, food processing, pulp-paper and construction are 
leading the way. The presence of Brazilian multinational 
companies is already being felt in South America and el-
sewhere. In 2006, for the first time ever, Brazil’s foreign di-
rect investment surpassed those coming into the country. 
The acquisition of INCO, a Canadian mining company, 
worth $18 billion by Vale do Rio Doce exceeded the total 
foreign direct investment in Brazil during 2006. This eco-
nomic phenomenon deserves academic research because 
of its implication for domestic social policies. 
Internationalization strengthens companies; make 
them more profitable but leads to job losses domestically. 
The possible hollowing out of the industrial base is a se-
rious socio-economic problem because of the high degree 
of urbanization [90%] of the country. Already, Brazilian 
major cities are populated by an increasing army of thou-
sands of poor-uneducated young men and women that, 
with easy access to guns, are creating a lethal social pro-
blem of crime and violence. If industrial de-basing is per-
mitted to happen, the consequences will be serious since 
urban violence and crime will become more out of control. 
To find a solution for this complex conundrum should be 
the top priority for President Lula in his second term in 
office and his successor in 2010.
Finally, despite conflicts and differences, MERCOSUR 
has been expanding with inclusion of Venezuela that be-
came full member on the symbolic date 
of 4th July 2006. Commercial-economic 
links with other South American coun-
tries have been strengthened due to the 
internationalization process of Brazilian 
companies. The bloc’s continuity can be 
explained by internal and external factors. 
The weak institutional framework descri-
bed previously, paradoxically, is a strength since its ‘flexi-
bility’ helps to withstand constant political and economic 
crises within the bloc. If MERCOSUR had adopted a rigid 
system of rules and regulations, similar to the European 
Union-NAFTA, the bloc would have collapsed a long time 
ago. 
The impasse on WTO-Doha, FTAA and EU talks also 
works to strengthen the bloc because regional integration 
remains the only game in town to be played. China’s de-
mand for commodities helps the bloc since it guarantees 
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a large and steady flow of hard currency. One school of 
thought argues that the world’s economic paradigm has 
been changed by the spectacular growth of the Chinese 
and Indian economies for the foreseeable future. If that 
proves to be the case, MERCOSUR –strong on natural re-
sources based exports - will continue to benefit from this 
shift in paradigm.
Part III. Outlook for MERCOSUR-China Relations
The future is always elusive but what can we expect 
from China-Latin America’s relations in the near future? 
As the title of this paper proposes, will the relation be of 
partnership or rivalry-conflict? To attempt to answer tho-
se questions, the endgame of WTO-Doha trading talks is 
used to do an exercise of scenario-construction. The best-
case scenario is a successful ending of Doha-FTAA talks 
combined with sustainable growth of the world economy. 
The worst-case scenario is ‘status quo’ i.e., impasse and/or 
collapse of Doha-FTTA talks combined with a slow down 
of the world economy. 
Scenario I. Positive Outcome Doha-FTTA Talks
Brazil-MERCOSUR= Extremely Positive 
México, Central America-Caribbean = Neutral or Negative
Scenario II. Negative Outcome Doha-FTAA Talks 
Brazil-MERCOSUR = Negative 
México, Central América-Caribbean = Negative 
 
Scenario I. A successful ending of Doha-FTAA talks im-
plies better market access to the agro-business. Brazil-
MERCOSUR, agriculture and bio-energy powerhouse is a 
clear winner. The result is neutral or negative for Mexico, 
Central America and the Caribbean since they are net agri-
cultural importers. Brazil-MERCOSUR trading position is 
strengthened since improved access to high-income ma-
rkets can be translated into a permanent improvement in 
the balance of payments position. This, in turn, gives extra 
time to update infrastructure and improve productivity of 
manufactured goods. Mexico, Central America-Caribbean 
continues to suffer full court pressure from Chinese im-
ports and worsening trade position with the Asian eco-
nomy can be expected. The only solution for Mexico is to 
continue attracting large amounts of foreign direct invest-
ment, upgrade antiquate infrastructure, significantly im-
prove education-training of the working force and promo-
te an effective income-distribution policy. 
Scenario II. The status quo of impasse and/or collapse of 
Doha-FTAA talks is very dangerous for Latin America 
because the balance of payments becomes vulnerable to 
abrupt changes in external conditions. Trade conflicts 
can escalate in sensitive areas of steel-related production 
of consumer goods and automotive manufacturing. This 
scenario can turn even worse if the world economy slows 
down, stagnates or goes into recession.13 This worst case is 
an acid test for economic-commercial relations with China 
because diplomacy and cooperation will be first casualty all 
over the world. In this case, for Mexico, highly dependent 
and integrated into the North American market, the results 
would be catastrophic. Brazil-MERCOSUR perhaps could 
fare better since it has a relatively large domestic market to 
fall back on and a diversified trade-exporting base. 
The outcome of the FTAA talks, included in the two 
scenarios above, is a question for a post-Bush administra-
tion. It can opt out from two policy positions to deal with 
Latin America: 
(I) Keeping the status quo of benign neglect [High 
probability]. China’s presence in the region continues 
unabated. Only a serious conflict Beijing-Brasilia 
(highly unlikely) could check the Asian influence 
in South America. Beijing can prevent escalation of 
trade disputes through fine-tuning of economic di-
plomacy. In case bilateral trade balance turns highly 
negative for Brasilia, it can be compensated via spee-
ding up direct investment in Brazilian natural resour-
ces-based industry and infrastructure.
(II) Engages Brazil-MERCOSUR with an integration 
agenda that cannot be refused [Very low probabili-
ty]. A merging of MERCOSUR-NAFTA creates a 
hybrid integration process with components of free 
trade and the European model. This implies making 
(politically) difficult concessions on immigration 
and financial assistance to Latin America. This (hi-
ghly unlikely) scenario is the only chance to counter 
China’s growing presence in South America. A tight, 
highly integrated Western Hemisphere would beco-
me a strategic rival rather than a partner of China. 
Summary-conclusions: The answer is not in China or in 
the stars 
To sum up, this paper concludes that China emergence 
has already been felt in the Western Hemisphere, creating 
winners and losers in the short run. Using boxing as a meta-
phor, the first round is over. In one corner, the bruised eco-
nomies of the United States-Mexico. Next to US/Mexico, 
the still unscathed economy of Brazil-MERCOSUR. In 
the opposite corner, the Chinese economy observing with 
a mixture of joy-apprehension the next round. What will 
happen next is difficult to forecast. A simple exercise sho-
ws that under different assumptions, the relation can vary 
from partnership to rivalry. However, under different as-
sumptions-scenarios, economic and trade cooperation 
between China-Brazil/MERCOSUR has the best chance to 
be sustained and prosper. Global political, economic, cul-
tural and technological factors are highly favorable to such 
outcome.
However, at the end of the day – as the current saying 
goes – it is up to each country to make difficult choices 
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for grabbing up opportunities offered by globalization. The 
formula for success is quite well known but difficult to put 
together and be implemented. It requires a well-prepared 
political elite, sensible economic policies, highly educated-
trained working force and a political system that provides 
opportunity for the majority and not for a privileged mi-
nority. China seems to be in the right path of that formula. 
Latin America has a long way to go in finding the right 
combination of that winning prescription.
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